[P]risoners do not lose their right to practice their religion when the prison gate closes behind them.
The University of Chicago Law Review [74:1443 lar context of "incidental impact" claims. Second, in 1995, for reasons unrelated to Smith, Congress enacted PLRA, which required physical injury for prisoner claims of mental and emotional distress. Third, in 2000, Congress enacted RLUIPA in an effort to reverse by statute the effect of Smith on prisoners.
Because RLUIPA was intended to reinstate pre-Smith rights and remedies for prisoners, the pre-Smith framework for assessing damages for constitutional violations provides a useful baseline for assessing damages for violations of RLUIPA. A pair of Supreme Court decisions in 1978 and 1986 established the framework for awarding damages for constitutional torts, including violations of the First Amendment. Those decisions do not require physical harm for the recovery of compensatory damages.
This Comment argues that PLRA should not be construed to require physical harm as a predicate for the recovery of full compensatory damages under RLUIPA. Moreover, even if PLRA does limit the recovery of damages for mental and emotional distress under RLUIPA in the absence of physical harm, it does not bar the recovery of compensatory damages under RLUIPA for the loss of the free exercise rights that are protected by the statute.
I. COMMON LAW OF COMPENSATION
Two key Supreme Court cases govern how courts evaluate nonphysical injuries resulting from the deprivation of rights. Examining them together provides a summary of the common law of damages for constitutional torts. First, the decision in Carey v Piphus 9 held that claims for constitutional torts are governed by traditional tort law. 10 Then Memphis Community School District v Stachura 11 clarified that damages cannot be awarded for the abstract value of a right. 12 Finally, traditional tort law provides alternatives to compensatory damages. Injunctions and nominal or punitive damages are appropriate alternatives under certain circumstances.
A. Carey and Constitutional Torts species of tort liability" for violations of constitutional rights.
14 Such claims, the Supreme Court has held, are governed by the compensation principle of Anglo-American tort law. 15 Compensatory damages are designed to provide recompense for injuries, including those caused by the deprivation or violation of rights. 16 Judges have considerable experience with private tort claims, and that experience allows them to make "the types of judgment concerning causation and magnitude of injury necessary to accord meaningful compensation for invasion of [constitutional] rights." 17 But this common law rule may not provide "a complete solution to the damages issue."
18 Constitutional rights and tort law protect generally parallel sets of interests, but when their protections diverge the "purpose of § 1983 would be defeated if injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights went uncompensated simply because the common law does not recognize an analogous cause of action." 19 Judges must tailor compensation "for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights" according to the particular interests being protected. 20 In Carey, the issue revolved around claims that a violation of due process resulted in mental and emotional distress. The Supreme Court found that if the denial of due process itself caused mental or emotional distress, it would not be difficult to produce evidence of its cause: "Distress is a personal injury familiar to the law, customarily proved by showing the nature and circumstances of the wrong and its effect on the plaintiff." 21 Compensatory damages for mental and emotional distress require "proof that such an injury was actually caused." 22 If proof is provided, compensatory damages are allowed under § 1983. 23 14 435 US at 253 (explaining the function of § 1983) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). 15 See id at 254-55 (discussing the compensation principle as reflected in § 1983 damages). 16 See id at 255-57 (noting that there were many lawyers in Congress in 1871 who would have been familiar with this basic concept of tort law). 17 Id at 259 (alteration in original), quoting Bivens v Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 US 388, 409 (1971) (Harlan concurring). 18 Carey, 435 US at 258. 19 Id. 20 Id at 259. 21 Id at 263-64 (" [W] e foresee no particular difficulty in producing evidence that mental and emotional distress actually was caused by the denial of procedural due process itself."). The denial of a prisoner's right to freely exercise his religion is especially likely to cause mental and emotional distress, regardless of what other loss accompanies the deprivation. Not every loss, however, is accompanied by distress. See, for example, Kerman v City of New York, 374 F3d 93, 124 (2d Cir 2004) (finding that "the jury could have been persuaded that Kerman suffered no more than minimal psychic or emotional damage" from his false imprisonment). Kerman was, according to testimony, "witty" during his experience. Id. 22 Carey, 435 US at 264. 23 Id. The University of Chicago Law Review [74:1443
The Court in Carey used defamation as an example of a tort "virtually certain to cause serious injury . . . [that] is extremely difficult to prove." 24 Like defamation, infringing a person's right to freely exercise his religion is "virtually certain to cause serious injury," although the injury would be to the person's state of mind rather than his reputation. Furthermore, the resulting damage might be impossible to prove the same way damages from conventional torts are proved. For instance, deprivation of worship services for several months may be a serious, though not physical, injury. 25 In a similar situation, one court found that although it is difficult "to put a monetary value on the deprivation of an opportunity to practice one's religion . . . the court believes that $50 will adequately compensate [the prisoner] for his injury." 26 Thus, compensatory damages are available for injuries-including mental and emotional distress-caused by a violation of constitutional rights. The Court's reasoning was based on traditional tort principles instead of on specific provisions of § 1983. The reasoning is independent of any particular statute. Therefore, where claims are brought under specific statutes granting a cause of action (such as RLUIPA) instead of under § 1983, such damages should remain available.
B. Stachura and Compensable Loss
The Supreme Court returned to the subject of damages in Stachura, holding that compensatory damages must be related to the injury and are never to reflect the abstract value a judge or jury places on the violated right. 27 Absent physical injury, presumed damages may be appropriate when they "roughly approximate the harm that the plaintiff suffered and thereby compensate for harms that may be impossible to measure." 28 The Supreme Court iterated that "neither the likelihood of such injury nor the difficulty of proving it is so great as to justify awarding compensatory damages without proof that such 24 Id at 262-63 (explaining that while serious harm to one's reputation almost inevitably produces mental and emotional distress, not every minor departure from due process will do the same). Although defamation law did not provide a good analogy for due process violations, First Amendment claims may be a better fit. See Stachura, 477 US at 314 (Marshall concurring) (quoting Carey's proposition that what makes damages appropriate for the violation of one constitutional right will not necessarily apply to a different right). 25 See Meyer v Teslik, 411 F Supp 2d 983, 989 (WD Wis 2006) (holding that missing just three services caused more than de minimis harm and did not preclude a claim under RLUIPA). 26 Vanscoy v Hicks, 691 F Supp 1336, 1338 (MD Ala 1988) (awarding compensatory damages to a prisoner who had been denied access-once-to the prison chapel). 27 See 477 US at 310. In his concurrence, Justice Marshall stressed that nevertheless, substantial damages could properly be awarded "simply upon a showing" of the deprivation of a right (to vote, in one instance) "without requiring any further demonstration of damages." Id at 314 (Marshall concurring) (emphasis added). 28 Id at 311 (majority). 29 But damages do not depend on the abstract value of a right; Stachura states that they depend only on "a particular injury . . . that might be compensated through substantial money damages." 30 The "presumed damages [are] for a nonmonetary harm that cannot easily be quantified" and are independent of the value of the right that was violated. 31 It is the harm, not the abstract right, which is being given some monetary value.
Justice Marshall clarified that the violation of a constitutional right "may itself constitute a compensable injury wholly apart from any emotional distress, humiliation and personal indignity, emotional pain, embarrassment, fear, anxiety and anguish suffered."
32 He reiterated that the jury instructions at issue in Stachura failed because they invited speculation about the right's abstract value instead of the actual loss sustained. 33 Understanding Stachura "to hold that deprivations of constitutional rights can never themselves constitute compensable injuries . . . would defeat the purpose of § 1983 by denying compensation for genuine injuries caused by the deprivation."
34
Where the harm is, in essence, the loss of the right, the actual compensable injury is the inability to exercise the right rather than any distress flowing from the loss. 35 The damages resulting from an injury, such as the denial of a single worship service, may be impossible to measure, as the Court in Stachura acknowledges, 36 but are nonetheless compensable. Regardless of the injury, what § 1983 requires is "proof of an affirmative causal connection between the actions taken by a defendant and the alleged constitutional deprivation." 37 Once such deprivation is shown, Carey says that there must be actual (though not necessarily physical) injury; Stachura says that where the injury is difficult to measure, courts may reach a rough approximation.
C. Noncompensatory Damages
For many years the only relief available to inmates was injunctive relief. Courts issued injunctions ordering prisons to provide appropri- 29 Carey, 435 US at 264. 30 Stachura, 477 US at 311 n 14. 31 Id. 32 Id at 313 (Marshall concurring) (quotation marks omitted). 33 See id at 315. 34 Id at 316. 35 See id at 313 ("[T]he violation of a constitutional right, in proper cases, may itself constitute a compensable injury."). 36 See id at 311 (majority A. Neutral Laws of General Applicability Alfred Smith and Galen Black belonged to the Native American Church and used peyote for sacramental purposes. They were subsequently fired from their jobs at a private drug rehabilitation organization. 46 Although they claimed that "their religious motivation for using peyote place [d] them beyond the reach of a criminal law that is not specifically directed at their religious practice," Oregon denied them unemployment benefits. 47 The Supreme Court eventually held that "if prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is not the object of the [law] but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended." 48 Prior to Smith, the prevailing test for a violation of the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause had been the compelling interest 44 Id at 54-55. See also id at 55 n 21 (" [A] fter Carey punitive damages may be the only significant remedy available in some § 1983 actions where constitutional rights are maliciously violated but the victim cannot prove compensable injury."). 45 Geiger, 404 F3d at 375 (denying an injunction where there was no threat of future violations). 46 Smith, 494 US at 874. 47 Id at 878. 48 Id. 62 See 42 USC § 2000cc(a)(1). The provisions on land use prohibit government from imposing land use regulations "in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution." Id. 63 RLUIPA applies to people in "state-run institutions-mental hospitals, prisons, and the like." Cutter, 544 US at 720. As of this writing only one published case has been brought on be- In the late 1960s the impetus for prison reform began to grow, due in part to prisoners bringing § 1983 claims. 68 Prisons were recognized to be filthy, unhealthy, unfit for human habitation. 69 But by the early 1990s public perception changed to the view that prisoners were overwhelming the court system with frivolous lawsuits.
70 Congress acted to limit these suits by passing PLRA.
PLRA contains numerous reforms intended to make it harder for a prisoner to file any type of lawsuit. 71 The key provision regarding RLUIPA damages is 42 USC § 1997e(e), which restricts the damages available to prisoners: "No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental and emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury."
72 This "physical injury requirement" places a significant bar in the way of prisoners seeking to recover damages
The Commerce Clause too has wide application. For instance, many RLUIPA cases deal with diet claims. See note 121 and accompanying text. Food resources nearly always cross state lines at some point; likewise for religious paraphernalia. For an example of a case relying on food crossing state lines, see Katzenbach v McClung, 379 US 294, 298-305 (1964) (holding that Ollie's Barbecue was subject to the Civil Rights Act because it served food that "moved in commerce" and that such food was subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause). For a discussion of the idea that "if every effect on interstate commerce were enough to trigger federal authority, there would be nothing that Congress could not regulate," see 
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for RLUIPA claims. Courts have struggled to reconcile PLRA with the need for "appropriate relief" for nonphysical injuries.
73
Part of the problem may lie in the fact that PLRA was intended to curb perceived abuses of the courts by prisoners. 74 It was not intended to prevent prisoners from bringing meritorious suits. 75 But when Congress passed RLUIPA five years later, it did not clearly define the meaning of "appropriate relief" and made no attempt to reconcile the apparent conflict between RLUIPA-enacted with the goal of preserving rights-and PLRA-enacted with the goal of limiting remedies.
III. CONFLICTING STATUTES
RLUIPA and PLRA have not enjoyed peaceful coexistence. The text and context of RLUIPA indicate numerous possible interpretations. The overlapping territory between RLUIPA and the First Amendment has led to varied results when courts interpret claims. Furthermore, PLRA poses a complication and even raises the specter of unconstitutionality. RLUIPA's language of "appropriate relief" is in direct tension with PLRA's physical injury requirement.
A. RLUIPA Congress attempted to specify how courts should interpret RLUIPA: it is not to be construed to amend or repeal PLRA, 76 but it is to be "construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this [Act] PLRA is actually comprised of two separate provisions, each with a decidedly different emphasis and purpose. First, PLRA contains the STOP provisions, which limit the circumstances under which courts may enter injunctions against unconstitutional prison conditions such as overcrowding, and which ostensibly were intended to "get the federal courts out of the business of running jails." Id at 547-48. Second, PLRA contains provisions that establish new procedural requirements for prisoners' civil suits designed "to curtail abusive prisoner tort, civil rights, and conditions litigation." Id. 75 86 The section's plain language construction has been universally rejected by the courts to avoid an unconstitutional result; if it were read to require a physical injury before a prisoner could bring any claim at all, prisoners would be barred from bringing claims for many due process violations, for example. The Department of Justice has instead taken the position that PLRA "leaves untouched claims for damages brought to vindicate a constitutional right or to punish for violation of that right."
87 At least three circuits have found that prisoners are entitled to nominal and punitive damages for violations of constitutional rights.
88 Section 1997e(e) does not address these forms of damages.
89
Decisions from the federal courts of appeals reflect uncertainty about applying PLRA to First Amendment claims. The Ninth Circuit suggested that courts are misstating the claims being brought because the plaintiff is not asserting a claim for "mental or emotional injury." 84 In over one hundred RLUIPA cases studied for this Comment, only one was brought by a female prisoner: Fayson v Earle, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 81567 (D Del) (holding that the denial of halal meals for a Muslim inmate gives rise to an RLUIPA claim). 85 Levinson, 99 Colum L Rev at 888 (cited in note 3) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted) (theorizing that there is a right-remedy relationship of "remedial substantiation, meaning just that the practical value of a right is determined by its associated remedies"). 86 
90
Another court 91 cited Stachura and explained even more clearly that " [w] here the harm that is constitutionally actionable is physical or emotional injury occasioned by a violation of rights, § 1997e(e) applies. In contrast, where the harm that is constitutionally actionable is the violation of intangible rights-regardless of actual physical or emotional injury-section 1997e(e) does not govern."
92
Such a construction of § 1997e(e) follows from a careful analysis of the statute's language: "A prisoner is barred from bringing into federal court an action 'for' emotional damages suffered while in custody, unaccompanied by physical injury. However, the constitutional violations of the type at issue here are not actions 'for' emotional distress."
93 Certain rights, the right to free exercise of religion prime among them, are "amorphous" rights. 94 They are not concerned with preventing specific harms, such as unreasonable searches and seizures, but rather with preserving certain areas of choice from "all official control." 95 Claims are brought for the loss of the right-to vote, for example, or to worship-and any emotional harm flows from that loss the way it would flow from any physical injury. Mental or emotional distress is a symptom only, not a cause of action.
The Zehner was brought by prisoners who had been exposed to asbestos and were seeking damages for mental and emotional distress, but who had no physical injuries. Id at 460. 99 Therefore, no other injury need be alleged in order for the court to grant relief.
100
The Third Circuit, however, found in Allah v Al-Hafeez 101 that mental or emotional distress itself was the harm forming the basis for any award of damages.
102 It believed that the Stachura analysis of damages resulting from deprivation of rights applied solely to voting rights cases. 103 Yet the Supreme Court's analysis in Stachura uses the history of compensation for voting rights as an example of how damages should be assessed when rights are violated. At no point does the Court limit its analysis or its holding to voting rights alone; in fact, Stachura itself was about claims for First and Fourteenth Amendment violations and was remanded because the jury instructions were erroneous-not because compensatory damages were unavailable.
104
Contrary to the Third Circuit's holding in Allah, the Supreme Court views damages for violations of rights as being compensation for loss of the right and any subsequent injury. 105 The Third Circuit skipped the actual harm (the loss). The Allah court looked only to the accompanying and identifiable symptom of distress as though it were the basis of the claim.
Where claims are unconnected to physical harm, " § 1997e(e) would bar a prisoner's recovery of compensatory damages for mental and emotional injury. But if that same prisoner alleges some other type of nonphysical injury, the statute would not foreclose recovery, assuming that the damages sought were not 'for' any mental or emo- 97 Id at 462. Otherwise, the court thought, qualified immunity might often be unconstitutional. Id Such reasoning illustrates the problem courts face: are claims for the right or for the distress of being deprived of it? While PLRA can reasonably be read to ban compensation damages for RLUIPA violations in the absence of physical injury, the better reading is that appropriate relief should be governed by the traditional damages rule, which requires actual-but not physicalinjury when constitutional rights are violated. By analogy to First Amendment § 1983 claims, the traditional rule should extend to injuries caused by violations of RLUIPA statutory rights.
C. Conflict
The narrowest reading of § 1997e(e) is that prisoners are barred from bringing claims solely for mental and emotional distress; but when a claim is brought for some other injury, mental and emotional distress may also be claimed. A prisoner bringing suit under RLUIPA would have a claim for violation of statutory rights and, usually, some associated loss, such as access to services. Either the violation of the right or the associated loss may lead to mental and emotional distress, but almost never physical injury.
The typical absence of physical injury is the crux of the problem. If applied to constitutional or RLUIPA claims, § 1997e(e) "would effectively immunize officials from liability for severe constitutional [or statutory] violations, so long as no physical injury is established." 107 A prisoner who suffered some physical harm would be allowed to recover damages for accompanying mental and emotional distress, but a prisoner who suffered serious violations of his constitutional or statutory rights without any physical harm would be unable to collect any damages. 108 When the right violated is RLUIPA's statutory right of free exercise of religion, such a result is deeply problematic. 107 Siggers-El, 433 F Supp 2d at 816 (finding that " § 1997e(e) is unconstitutional as applied"). 108 See id. The physical injury must be more than de minimis, id; this conclusion seems to be the consensus across the circuits. See If RLUIPA is to be construed in favor of broad protection, appropriate relief should match that available for constitutional torts. But if it is to be construed strictly according to PLRA, appropriate relief might be limited to, at most, punitive damages. RLUIPA's provisions thus seem to contradict each other.
When bringing First Amendment claims, "prisoners need not allege a physical injury to recover damages because the deprivation of the constitutional right is itself a cognizable injury, regardless of any resulting mental or emotional injury." 110 The parallel for RLUIPA would be that the deprivation of free exercise (as a statutory right) is a cognizable-and compensable-injury. If the injury is the deprivation itself, then compensation for that injury may, according to traditional tort law, include damages for mental and emotional distress. Courts have not yet reached this conclusion.
111
In fact, what is emerging in RLUIPA cases is more confusion than consensus. Courts are divided over whether PLRA applies to RLUIPA or First Amendment claims 112 and whether it allows nominal or punitive damages. 113 No court has yet found that compensatory damages are available for RLUIPA claims unaccompanied by physical injury. 114 At least one court has awarded substantial compensatory damages for a First Amendment claim, PLRA notwithstanding.
115
Other courts have simply indicated uncertainty. 110 Calhoun, 319 F3d at 940 (emphases added). 111 Examining a few results in RLUIPA cases brings to light some of these concerns. In one area of RLUIPA there is wide agreement: courts are comfortable awarding injunctive and declaratory relief. Courts have also addressed the issues of monetary relief and sovereign immunity; the Fourth Circuit recently issued the first circuit court opinion on the subject. Finally, some courts have considered requests for nominal and punitive damages.
A. Injunctions and Declaratory Relief
Displaying sensitivity to plaintiffs' prayers for relief by issuing injunctions, for instance where an inmate requests a special diet to comply with religious restrictions, courts have extended pre-Smith protection for religious dietary needs. 121 Courts have found that governments (including prisons and officials) impose substantial burdens on prisoners' exercise of religious beliefs, and that they do not use the least restrictive means of furthering compelling government interests. . 117 See note 112 and accompanying text. 118 See note 126 for a short discussion of a split on grooming policies. 119 In particular, courts have varied in how they evaluate "substantial burden"; how they evaluate the belief (as merely sincere, as central to the religion, or as part of the mainstream doctrine); and how much deference to give prison officials, which goes to the "least restrictive means" requirement. See note 83 for examples of these differing approaches to construing claims brought under the First Amendment as RLUIPA claims and vice versa. 120 The differences among courts on the various aspects of damages are noted below. 121 Cases holding that prisons must respect inmates' religious diet restrictions stretch back to before Smith. See Likewise courts have granted some relief where inmates requested special services. 123 Allowing prisoners a visit with clergy is an ancient custom, and this country has traditionally allowed prisoners access to chaplains.
124 Prisoners bringing claims under RLUIPA, however, are often seeking more than mere access to a religious leader; hence, requests for certain types of religious services or permission for certain rites can raise serious security concerns. RLUIPA claims requesting injunctions against restrictive grooming policies have met with mixed results. 126 In Warsoldier v Woodford, 127 the court found that "the grooming policy constitutes a substantial burden on Warsoldier's religious practice," and that the prisoner faced irreparable injury if the court did not enjoin enforcement of the policy. 128 Warsoldier was a Native American who believed that if he cut his hair he would not only lose his wisdom and strength, he would also lose the ability "to join his ancestors in the afterlife and that instead, the deceased members of his tribe will subject him to taunting and ridicule." 129 The court found that the "policy forces Warsoldier to choose between following his religious beliefs and suffering continual punishment, and abandoning his religious beliefs to avoid Prisoners today no longer find courts as sympathetic as they once were. See, for example, Ho Ah Kow v Nunan, 12 F Cases 252, 253 (Cir Ct Cal 1879) ("The maltreatment consisted in having wantonly and maliciously cut off the queue of the plaintiff, a queue being worn by all Chinamen, and its deprivation being regarded by them as degrading and as entailing future suffering."). The court held, in conferring judgment on the plaintiff:
A treatment to which disgrace is attached, and which is not adopted as a means of security against the escape of the prisoner, but merely to aggravate the severity of his confinement, can only be regarded as a punishment additional to that fixed by the sentence. If adopted in consequence of the sentence it is punishment in addition to that imposed by the court; if adopted without regard to the sentence it is wanton cruelty. Plaintiffs also sometimes seek declaratory relief, which can be useful even after their claims have been rendered moot for the purposes of an injunction, because "a declaratory judgment as a predicate to a damages award can survive" even after claims for injunctive relief are dismissed. 136 When prison officials change their policies, that change "does not moot plaintiff's claim for either declaratory or monetary relief." 137 
Id at 254 (emphasis added). See also

B. Monetary Damages and Sovereign Immunity
Two issues of immunity arise under RLUIPA: sovereign immunity for states and qualified immunity for officials. Sovereign immunity has concerned the courts because it was not entirely clear if, by accepting federal funds, states waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. 138 Most initial cases under RLUIPA were dismissed on the grounds of qualified immunity, and thus preempted serious analysis of what damages are available. 139 Courts are now trending toward finding that states waive immunity to suit, but not immunity to monetary damages. 140 In other words, prisoners can sue governments but cannot claim monetary damages. Courts remain divided, however, over the questions of the availability of nominal and punitive damages as well.
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The Fourth Circuit concluded in Madison v Virginia 141 that states do not waive their immunity to money damages under RLUIPA by accepting federal funds for state prisons. 142 Furthermore, even if the state were amenable to suit, such amenability does not automatically provide for monetary damages. 143 The court stated, "We conclude that RLUIPA's 'appropriate relief against a government' language falls short of the unequivocal textual expression necessary to waive State immunity from suits for damages." 144 Given that "ambiguities are construed in favor of immunity," 145 monetary damages from defendants sued in their official capacities "are unavailable under RLUIPA." 146 No money damages are available from individuals in their official capacities because no money damages are available from the state. 147 Essentially, then, "the suit against the defendants in their official capacities is barred by the Eleventh Amendment." 148 Already immune in their official capacities, government officials may also be granted qualified immunity. "The doctrine of qualified immunity protects state officials from personal liability for on-the-job conduct so long as the conduct is objectively reasonable and does not violate an inmate's clearly-established federal constitutional and statutory rights." 149 As mentioned above, most early RLUIPA suits The University of Chicago Law Review [74:1443 never reached the issue of damages because they were dismissed upon a finding of qualified immunity for the officials.
150
Courts disagree about whether or not officials are liable in their individual capacities. 151 If monetary damages are unavailable from the state, a prisoner's only chance for compensatory damages is to sue an actor in his individual capacity. Because RLUIPA's language in 42 USC § 2000cc-5(4) tracks closely with that in § 1983, courts have reasoned that Congress must have meant to include officials in their individual capacities. 152 Furthermore, Congress could have expressly limited relief to equitable or declaratory relief, but did not. If RLUIPA had been meant to exclude certain forms of relief, it could easily have done so; the fact that it did not may mean that monetary damages are available. damages from officials acting in their individual capacities remains an unsettled question. Again, almost no cases brought under RLUIPA include allegations of physical harm. 154 Nominal damages are a longstanding remedy for violations of rights that do not result in any harm-they "are an appropriate means of vindicating rights whose deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury."
155 While nominal damages are an appropriate remedy where no "real" harm has been done, they may not be where the harm is more substantial-for instance, where a prisoner is repeatedly punished for refusing to eat a certain diet or comply with a grooming policy. 156 Many courts agree that nominal damages are available to vindicate RLUIPA rights.
157
Punitive damages should be available for RLUIPA claims.
158
" [P] unitive damages are never awarded as a matter of right; the finder of fact, after reviewing the entire record, is called upon to make a 'moral judgment' that the unlawful conduct warrants such an award to punish the wrongdoer and deter others." Any solution to the confusion about RLUIPA relief must account for the purpose of RLUIPA (to protect the free exercise of prisoners), the purpose of PLRA (to reduce frivolous litigation by prisoners), and the purpose of compensatory damages (to compensate for actual injury). The solution proposed here considers the problem of collapsing parallel First Amendment and RLUIPA claims and how that endangers the protection Congress envisioned. Regardless of any collapsing of claims, RLUIPA cases face the challenge of PLRA's physical injury requirement. A careful analysis of the consequences attendant on imposing a physical injury requirement before allowing any remedies shows that such a requirement would make RLUIPA a null statute for prisoners. 162 If RLUIPA parallels a constitutional right in statute form, however, courts may be able to follow pre-Smith precedent for awarding compensatory damages.
A. RLUIPA and First Amendment Claims As stated above, most RLUIPA claims do not include allegations of physical harm. 163 Instead, they mimic First Amendment claims where the damage is the denial of a right and the loss incurred, not harm to the physical person. Because the RLUIPA standard is stricter-that is, the least restrictive means to protect a compelling government interest instead of neutral laws (or policies) of general applicability-the conduct violating RLUIPA covers more territory than conduct violating the First Amendment. But the domains of violations are similar, and the fundamental right-the free exercise of religion-is identical even though one is statutory and one is constitutional. 164 For prisoners, "RLUIPA provides additional protection for religious worship, respecting that Smith set only a constitutional floornot a ceiling-for the protection of personal liberty." 165 But damages are not analyzed until after a violation has been established. Because establishing a violation depends on the differing standards for RLUIPA and the First Amendment, it is crucial to evaluate the claims separately. Sometimes courts improperly conflate claims, using the standard set forth in Smith to evaluate RLUIPA claims. 166 What is particularly unfortunate about such an error in process is that it directly undercuts the very purpose of RLUIPA. Congress made the effort not once, but twice, to pass a statute reinstating what it viewed as core First Amendment values. Furthermore, when the first statute (RFRA) was struck down and Congress narrowed the scope for RLUIPA, it deliberately chose to protect the group of people most vulnerable to government pressure and most susceptible to harm: prisoners. By conflating RLUIPA and First Amendment claims when analyzing possible violations, courts deny prisoners the stronger protection of their statutory rights when the prisoners fail to meet the higher bar for establishing a violation of their constitutional rights.
B. RLUIPA and PLRA RLUIPA specifically states that it is not to be "construed to amend or repeal the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995."
167 Although it passed PLRA in order to cut down on prisoner litigation, the cases Congress sought to prohibit were not those making serious constitutional claims but those that were entirely frivolous. 168 Claims that are only for mental and emotional distress unconnected to an actual injury (loss) are not eligible for monetary damages. Nominal or punitive damages may, of course, be appropriate, as described above. 166 What was recoverable as compensatory damages for First Amendment violations pre-Smith remained recoverable after it-until PLRA was passed. The physical injury requirement is what altered the damages available. Smith changed the difficulty of proving a deprivation of free exercise rights, and PLRA made it nearly impossible to get damages when these rights were violated, according to the way most courts have interpreted it. So when RLUIPA came along, a mere statute instead of the actual First Amendment, it did not make much headway for getting damages.
RLUIPA states that "[a] person may assert a violation of this [Act] as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government."
169 When the distress is caused by a violation that once would have been considered a deprivation of a First Amendment (constitutional) right and is now a deprivation of an RLUIPA (statutory) right, appropriate relief may entail compensatory damages. RLUIPA is acting in the stead of the First Amendment, according to Congress's intent; therefore, violations of RLUIPA ought to be treated as if they were constitutional violations. As the Supreme Court stated in Stachura, damages cannot be awarded for abstract rights-such as the right to freely exercise one's religion-but they can be awarded for specific losses-such as the loss of worship services or sacred objects.
So two situations are possible. First, the deprivation of the right of free exercise causes an actual injury of some kind, which the court can identify and evaluate. Second, the deprivation of the right of free exercise is identifiable but does not seem to cause any actual injury. In the first situation, the injury is likely to be a lost opportunity. 170 Courts, accustomed to calculating the value of intangible losses (such as consortium) are well-equipped to determine the value of, for instance, denial of religious services over a period of months, or the forced shearing of a prisoner's hair. 171 If a court decides that an actual injury occurred-as the courts did for the voting rights cases alluded to in Stachura-then it should be able to compensate for that actual injury. Because an actual injury could well cause mental and emotional distress, it is appropriate for courts to take that distress into consideration when determining compensation for the injury. In the second 169 42 USC § 2000cc-2(a). 170 RLUIPA cases almost invariably involve some sort of loss, often of proper diet, desired services, or access to paraphernalia. 171 Courts have determined the value of such losses. See, for example, Arroyo Lopez v Nuttall, 25 F Supp 2d 407, 410 (SDNY 1998) (awarding $2,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000 in punitive damages when a prisoner was shoved during prayer). See also Jackson v Verdini, 2005 Mass Super LEXIS 279, *4 n 1 (mentioning a previous settlement of one such claim for $20,000). situation, where no actual injury is determined, compensatory damages are probably not available; and because there is no actual loss, any mental or emotional distress triggered by the deprivation are, in theory, compensable with nominal damages.
172
If RLUIPA is interpreted to be tightly constrained by PLRA's physical injury requirement, prisoners would have no recourse when they suffer a one-time deprivation of their right or a deprivation the prison subsequently amends. They would not be eligible for injunctive relief where they cannot show likelihood of recurrence. They cannot claim punitive damages (where the circuit would allow them) if they cannot show actual malice. They would have no recompense at all for the violation.
Thus, PLRA would make RLUIPA's text inoperative for all but ongoing, persistent violations of free exercise rights, and, perhaps, violations caused by clear malice and therefore eligible for punitive damages. Prisoners would lack a remedy under RLUIPA even though the violation of their rights was established and even where it comes close to shocking the conscience, as when a prisoner, whose religious beliefs prevent him from cutting his hair, is forcibly restrained and shaved by fellow inmates. 173 In other words, applying the PLRA physical injury requirement instead of the traditional rule's actual injury requirement renders Congress's Act a nullity.
Although PLRA's physical injury requirement has the potential to fatally undercut the protective purpose of RLUIPA, allowing RLUIPA claims to win compensatory damages for actual-though not physical-injury would not undercut PLRA's purpose of inhibiting frivolous litigation. It may be important to bear in mind that while prisoners sometimes demand millions, 174 courts are more sensible about appropriate damages. 175 Cases where prisoners endure depriva- 172 In unusual situations, where the violation is caused by egregious behavior, a court might award punitive damages as well. The Supreme Court, however, has recently insisted that punitive damages be tied to compensatory damages in some rational proportion. tions of their free exercise rights that merit large damages are extremely few and far between. Therefore, courts should heed RLUIPA's mandate of appropriate relief by applying the traditional tort law of compensation damages, PLRA's physical injury requirement notwithstanding.
In this way the prisoner will receive no more and no less than proper recompense for the loss stemming from his violated right: he is compensated neither for the abstract value of the right itself nor his mental and emotional distress alone. But to read PLRA to bar all compensatory damages would be to make RLUIPA a meaningless gesture against Smith's incursion on First Amendment rights. Even if PLRA is read to bar claims under RLUIPA for mental and emotional distress, it should not bar claims for compensatory damages for the loss of free exercise rights.
CONCLUSION
RLUIPA was drafted to ensure that no government or government actor shall "impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise" of prisoners.
176 Claims under the statute entitled to appropriate relief should be compensated as a constitutional tort would be. While that would often mean no more than nominal damages in compensation, it does leave open the door for punitive damages when prison officials act in malicious ways. And where the prisoner's loss is a provable-though not physical-injury that a court can measure, such as the loss of hair or access to worship services, courts are competent to grant compensation damages for that loss.
Finally, although many plaintiffs lose their RLUIPA cases, or do not win monetary awards, they have been winning a changed system. One court warned that its dismissal of claims "should not be construed as a license to ignore future religious accommodation requests from inmates with individualized religious beliefs." 177 The court made its expectations clear: "Defendants will take the religious accommodation requests seriously and document their efforts to find the least restrictive means to protect the compelling interests at stake in a correctional setting."
178 Prisons have adapted to provide more flexible meal programs, a wider array of religious services, and in some circumstances are showing more toleration for religious items. If Congress's intent was to protect the free exercise of religion by statute as it was once protected by the First Amendment, it may have succeeded in spite of the uncertainty it created in the law. . Whether or not Congress considered Wiccans and Buddhists when it passed RLUIPA, the protections the statute affords are faithful to the original goals of the First Amendment: to preserve the right to freely exercise one's religion, whatever it may be.
